



In decision theory, it is almost universally presupposed that agency is invested in individuals: each 
person acts on her own preferences and beliefs.  A person’s preferences may take account of the 
effects of her actions on other people; she may, for example, be altruistic or have an aversion to 
inequality.  Still, these are her preferences, and she chooses what she most prefers.  Opposing this 
orthodoxy is a small body of literature which allows teams of individuals to count as agents, and 
which seeks to identify distinctive modes of team reasoning that are used by individuals as 
members of teams. This entry explains the motivation for and general principles of team reasoning. 
It then presents the two leading theories of team reasoning, those of Michael Bacharach and Robert 
Sugden, which differ in important ways regarding: how group agency comes about, what happens 
when there is not common knowledge of group membership, and what the group agent should take 
as its goals. 
Team Reasoning 
One motivation for theories of team reasoning is that there are games of cooperation and 
coordination that are puzzles for orthodox decision theory, in the sense that there exists some 
strategy that is at least arguably rational and that a substantial number of people play in real life, but 
whose rationality decision theory cannot explain and whose play it cannot predict.  
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 Player 1 high  2, 2  0, 0 
   low  0, 0  1, 1     
 
Figure 1: Hi-Lo 
 
 
 One such puzzle is the game of Hi-Lo. In Hi-Lo, both (high, high) and (low, low) are Nash 
equilibria, each player has achieved the best possible payoff for herself given the action of the other 
player. Intuitively, it seems obvious that each player should choose high because both prefer the 
outcome of (high, high) to that of (low, low); but that ‘because’ has no standing in the formal 
 
 2 
theory. Standard game theory has no way of recommending or predicting one equilibrium over the 
other 
 The source of the puzzle seems to be located in the mode of reasoning by which, in the 
standard theory, individuals move from preferences to decisions.  In the syntax of game theory, 
each individual must ask separately ‘What should I do?’. In Hi-Lo, the answer to this question is 
indeterminate. Theories of team reasoning extend game theory to allow the players to ask ‘What 
should we do?’. In Hi-Lo, the answer to this question is surely: “Choose (high, high).”  
 The basic idea of team reasoning is that, when an individual reasons as a member of a team, 
she considers which combination of actions by members of the team would best promote the team’s 
objective, and then performs her part of that combination. It is still instrumental practical 
reasoning, where conclusions about what an agent ought to do are inferred from premises that 
include propositions about what the agent is seeking to achieve, but it allows that groups can be 
agents with group goals that provide their standards of success. When a group of people team 
reason, the rationality of each individual’s action derives from the rationality of the joint action of 
the team.  
Bacharach’s Circumspect Team Reasoning 
Bacharach presents the most comprehensive, formal theory of team reasoning. For Bacharach, 
people team reason when they group identify and whether a particular player identifies with a 
particular group is a matter of ‘framing’.  A frame is the set of concepts a player uses when thinking 
about her situation.  In order to  team reason, a player must have the concept ‘we’ in her frame.  
Bacharach proposes that the ‘we’ frame is normally induced or primed by games like Hi-Lo. 
 Although Bacharach proposes that some games increase the probability of group 
identification, he does not claim they invariably prime the ‘we’ frame. The ‘we’ frame might be 
primed but, alternatively, a player may see the game as one to be played by two separate individual 
agents. Bacharach models the psychology of group identification as a random process which, 
independently for each member of the group, determines whether or not that individual identifies 
with the group. Then an individual who group-identifies will maximize the expected value of the 
group payoff function given the probabilities that other group members fail to identify. This means 
that a player may find ex poste that she has team reasoned when the other player has not, leading to 
a worse outcome for herself than if she had not team reasoned - as sometimes happens in the 
experiments whose results Bacharach sought to explain.  
 




On Sugden’s account of mutually assured team reasoning, a person will not commit herself to team 
reasoning unless she has assurance that others will also act on team reasoning. Sugden uses a 
theoretical framework in which the central concept is reason to believe. To say that a person has 
reason to believe a proposition p is to say that p can be inferred from propositions that she accepts 
as true, using rules of inference that she accepts as valid. In mutually assured team reasoning, team 
members will not act on the results of team reasoning unless each has reason to believe of all the 
others that (1) they identify with the group and acknowledge the group payoff function as the 
objective of the group, and (2) they endorse and act on mutually assured team reasoning. So if 
Sugden’s group members are not sure that they will all cooperate to achieve what they all take to be 
best for the group, then they will not team reason.  
 Because Sugden’s team reasoners cooperate in a mutually advantageous enterprise, he 
would also constrain the group goal so that team reasoning is welfare increasing for its members, by 
their own individual lights. 
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See also Collective Agents, Collective Goals, Collective Intentionality, Collective Rationality, 
Common Knowledge, Cooperation (Coordination), Group Identity, Social Ontology, Recent 
Theories of.  
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